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THE RESTRUCTURING OF MEXICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES
AND THE APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 14 OF NAFTA
JOHN ROGERS,* MODERATOR; MIKE LUBRANO,*"
CARLOS AIZA HADDAD,*" LUIS DANTON MARTINEZ,.... AND
PANELISTS ......
TIMOTHY CANOVA," ...
ROGERS: Chapter 14 of NAFTA provides generally for an opening of the
Mexican financial system to foreign investment and competition but with a big
caveat.' There is the possibility of the exercise of the safeguard provisions. If the
concentration of the percentage of the market in Mexico of foreign-owned institutions in the banking sector exceeds 25%, then the Mexican government can step in
and impose the safeguard freeze for up to three years to stall the process.2 However,
under NAFTA there is no further limitation on investment by foreign banks in
Mexico.
I would like to ask our panelists to look at some of the issues we may face on
January 1, 2000. That is, where are we likely to be in the Mexican financial system
at the beginning of the year 2000? What is the bank regulatory and supervisory
system likely to be? To what extent are capital markets going to be a resource to
provide financing to the Mexican economy? We have talked briefly about the
Sociedad Financiera de Objecto Limitado (SOFOL), the limited purpose financial
institutions or non-bank banks, but not really about the insurance industry. Some
of these institutions may be able to play a role in supporting and helping banks
provide credit to the Mexican economy. I would like to start with Mike Lubrano,
and ask him where he thinks the bank supervisory system is likely to be in the year
2000?
LUBRANO: This is a very difficult thing to predict. One undeniable area of
progress has been in the effective monitoring function of the Banking Commission.
When the current President and all the Vice Presidents but one were appointed to
the Banking Commission in 1994, they started from scratch. That added to the
challenge of dealing with the banking crisis after the devaluation in 1994 and the
recession that followed. I think the capacity of the Commission has clearly
improved. In fact, as a condition of the World Bank's Financial Sector Restructuring Loan, the Commission agreed to review every major privatized bank on an
annual basis, as well as to conduct outside diagnostics on each of the banks. So the
capacity has increased dramatically.
That is not to say that there is still not a lot to do. Bank regulation and supervision is something that requires a great deal of institutional capacity and structures
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that provide for education of staff. That is very difficult to do in a short time. They
have received a great deal of assistance, including some from the United States. The
World Bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency provided other
assistance.
Some developments have aided the Commission. The Banking Commission now
has a smaller number of banks to supervise because so many have been intervened
and merged; they have much smaller assets than they had at the beginning of 1995.
Although many foreign banks have started up, those are not really the subjects of
on-site supervision. They hold a very small portion of the assets of the system. By
2001, the Banking Commission would be concerned with eight or ten banks.
Also, as in many countries, the Commission is able to piggyback on supervision
by the home country supervisors and regulators. That is, if Bank of Nova Scotia is
operating in Mexico, the Canadian authorities are also supervising it. It also has
corporate governance supervision. The market supervision is provided through the
information they have to give their own shareholders about their operations in
Mexico. If you are a supervisor, you have a greater degree of comfort that you are
not in there alone. It is another mechanism.
The classic example is the New Zealand model.3 In New Zealand they have
super-simplified their banking supervision because almost their entire banking
system is owned by foreign banks. They piggyback on that supervision because they
are much smaller than the other countries that are the owners of the banks that
operate there. This is also true in Mexico, both in the size of the country and the
economy; the economy of the U.S. is much bigger than Mexico's, as is Canada's,
so they could piggyback.
A final point is that new accounting rules went into effect for Mexican banks
after the crisis. This is another condition of the World Bank loan but something
of course that Mexico would have done in any case. Those rules are closer to
international standards than the old rules, which varied dramatically in terms of
when a loan would be counted as non-paying. The classification and provisioning
rules have not really been reformed in Mexico, but they will be at some point. The
new accounting rules are closer to international standards than before. They include
a bunch of provisional, temporary, measures that permit assets to be treated very
differently than they would elsewhere. Particularly, mortgage programs permit
mortgages to be treated almost as if they had been executed and the collateral
covered before they were recovered. This all amounts to a great deal of regulatory
forbearance which, barring some very dramatic change in the political system, can
be expected to continue.
ROGERS: We are assuming that whatever happens with the Fondo Bancario
para Protecci6n al Ahorro (FOBAPROA) rescue that the banks are going to remain
3. For a bank supervisor's response to the claim that New Zealand's supervision relies on the work of home
country supervisors, see Dr. Donald T. Brash, Governor, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, An Address to the IMF

Conference on:

Banking Soundness and Monetary Policy in a World of Global Capital Markets 11.12

(Jan.30,1997)(transcript available from the U.S.- MEXICO. LAW JOURNAL). Dr. Brash rejects the notion that New

Zealand is "free riding" on the efforts of the home supervisors by noting that Reserve Bank of New Zealand
"remains well informed about the activities and the financial condition of all banks operating in New Zealand and
well placed to respond to incipient financial distress where appropriate." However, he does concede that "any host
supervisor will -inevitably- rely to some extend on the global supervision of the home supervisor."
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somewhat weak and will continue to need additional capital. To what extent can the
Mexican government, through its regulatory and supervisory apparatus, encourage
the local shareholders of the banks to put in additional capital and what ability do
they have to welcome foreign capital?
LUBRANO: I think that much of what has been done since 1994 to assist the
Mexican banks has set all sorts of negative incentives for the bank shareholders.
It is doubtful that the capital originally in the banks when they were privatized was
fairly stated. The quality of the capital was unknown. It is certain that much of it
was phony capital; the question is just how much. Attracting more domestic
resources to the banks, particularly since the main assets of the banks are loans to
companies, may not get you very much. So I am not sure that there is any more
reason to create further negative incentives in terms of behavior by creating
incentives to re-capitalize the Mexican banks. That is just my personal opinion.
ROGERS: Then in terms of the other kinds of institutions that might be sources
of capital for the Mexican economy, what are the alternatives? Before we get to the
capital markets, what are the other kinds of existing institutions, what are the
capabilities of the securities firms, the commercial paper market, the SOFOLes, the
insurance companies?
NADER: It is difficult to predict. I think I have to look backward to try to
understand what is going to happen in the future. Some of the accommodations that
the system has made to boost capitalization of Mexican banks have had a pervasive
effect in a number of financial sectors. I will take two examples - financial leasing,.
which is a regulated activity in Mexico, and factoring, which is also regulated. The
size of the market in each of these two industries has shrunk dramatically in the last
two or three years and it has had the reverse effect that most of us thought it would
have vis-a-vis some of the NAFTA provisions.4 Annex VII provides that participation of foreign institutions in most of the financial sectors is subject to market caps
and individual market share participation in some instances. That is to increase
gradually until the year 2000, when most of the restrictions will go away. This
means that leasing and factoring affiliates of U.S. and Canadian companies could
have expected to increase their capitalization every year as the market would grow
over time. What has happened in these two sectors has been the opposite. Now there
are a number of leasing companies that were established as affiliates of foreign
financial institutions, that even if they wanted to, cannot increase their capitalization.
By allowing some of the larger banks to accommodate and slow their leasing
companies to boost their capitalization level, there is a pervasive effect in the
leasing market. It is almost the same in the factoring market. Between now and
January 1, 2000, we need to revamp these two focused and special industries which
are sources of capital, which in many instances can act much faster than the banks.
Some people would ask why the concern about leasing companies if banks can have
some of their lending portfolio documented in financial leasing. This is true, but the
skills and the infrastructure to do financial leasing in Mexico have proven to be very
different than those needed for banking.

4. NAFMA, supra note 1, at Annex VIL.
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Other institutions that could play a role would certainly be non-banks, to the
extent foreign players come in with a very focused eye for market niches. Mr. Aiza
Haddad was making reference to mortgage lenders that have captured a share of the
market through non-banks. I think that there are a number of opportunities and I
think that they will happen, but nothing that would have in the next two or three
years a major impact in boosting the debt of the financial markets in Mexico.
Insurance companies are the healthiest. Life companies that have also undertaken
annuities programs will have to split the annuities by the year 2001. That may give
rise to new joint ventures, especially in the field of annuities.
I think the other area where we could see a buildup of capital, although I do not
know how much could be deployed to the economy, will be in the pension fund
management system. The only purpose of an Administradora de los Fondos de
Retiro (AFORE) is to hold stock of mutual funds, which in turn invest retirement
funds. Until May of this year, AFOREs were only permitted to own one mutual
fund, which would invest primarily in government securities and, to a lesser degree,
in rated private sector securities. The regulatory body of AFOREs, despite the
wording in the law, has not permitted them to create additional mutual funds that
could diversify their investments into equities or infrastructure projects.
My initial reaction was that the prohibition on the creation of additional mutual
funds was for two reasons: first, because it is an entity that is basically learning to
do its job on the job, it is trying to keep a very small number of activities to be
supervised; and second, because of the experience we have had in supervising
mutual funds where they have invested basically in papers that no one else wanted
to invest. I thought that the decision was driven partly by inexperience and partly
by fear.
LUBRANO: That was a beautiful way of putting it: by inexperience and fear.
There is also the need to finance the government deficit. To the extent that the
pension funds which used to be available to finance the government deficit through
the social security system are no longer going that way, having a system which
requires most of the money from AFOREs to go toward purchasing government
debt solves that problem.
You are absolutely right about the experience of the mutual funds. The World
Bank supported the pension reform. When the reformers went public with their
plan, one of the first things they said was, "Don't worry; don't worry, we are not
going to do it like the mutual fund regulations. That is not our idea. We'll have
much tougher regulations." The article that I have written on the topic goes through
comparing the weaknesses of the mutual funds to the strengths of the AFORE
regulations. 5 We will see how good the supervision proves to be. But that is
absolutely right.
ROGERS: Michell, what about the investment capabilities of the insurance
companies?
NADER: Except for the two largest insurance companies, the remaining players
are building up capital. I think in the next few years we will start seeing life and
property and casualty companies growing into a more active lending or investing

5. Mike Lubrano, "Mexico Introduces Legal Framework for Management of Funded Mandatory Pension
Scheme. " IV NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATE LAWYER 1,171 (1997).
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role than what we have seen in the past few years. All of these companies have
been, to a certain extent, successful in shifting from a system that basically required
capitalization standards to a more modem system that requires satisfaction of
solvency margins. The difference is difficult to explain unless you are an actuary,
but I think that as time goes by this will show stronger insurance companies that
will be able to free up reserves which could then be devoted to the underlying
economy.
ROGERS: Let us talk a little bit about the capital markets. I probably exaggerated the difficulty of getting authorization from Banco de M6xico for securitization
programs. There have been a number of securitization programs launched. But the
securitizations have been for the most part selling securities to foreign investors. As
far as the Mexican local domestic capital market is concerned, do you see that as
playing a significant role, given the battering that the Bolsa has taken over the last
short period of time?
AIZA HADDAD: I am afraid not. In talking about the Mexican capital market,
there are several important issues to consider including surveillance. Mike
mentioned that in merging the banking and securities commissions, the existing
commission lost a lot of its know-how and its history. On the securities side, I think
the levels of confidence that investors currently have in the securities exchange and
in particular in matters relating to privileged information and insider trading is
extremely low. I think the commission has a lot of work to do to build up that
confidence. Not only the commission, but in particular, the Mexican securities
exchange and the Mexican broker dealers have a lot of work to do to make sure that
people acknowledge that there is some confidence there; not only a very limited
group of people who handle very important information can be successful investing
in the Mexican securities market. Publicity builds confidence. In Mexico, illegal
trade and corruption have only happened in very limited circumstances. When we
have had market crashes, a few people have been accused and fingers have been
pointed and that is really about it. So I think that confidence in the regulatory
system and the surveillance system is a major component of building up the
Mexican capital market. On the other hand, I do not know the numbers but I believe
that the actual percentage of the total market capitalization represented by
individual investors is extremely low. I remember back in 1987 before the crash
when comments were made by public officials a lot of very small investors went
into the market, made investments and lost their investments, people such as cab
drivers and housewives. Even though people say that bankers and people in
securities industries have very short memories, individuals do not. I think once
someone makes an investment in the securities market and loses his or her savings,
they never forget. I think that has an impact on market capitalization in Mexico. As
a matter of fact, individuals are inexperienced. It is inexperience, fear, and an
absolute lack of confidence. We really have to turn to institutional investors and
foreign investors to build up the capitalization of the market.
As Michell was saying, I think that the AFOREs at some point in time are really
going to have to play a major role in that development. I have had discussions about
the development of these new mutual funds: When are they going to authorize the
creation of additional mutual funds? What they have right now is pretty much
because mutual funds can only invest in securities. The principal is guaranteed and
the percentages that can be allocated in the portfolios of these mutual funds are

U.S.-MEXCO LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

represented mostly by government securities. Once we develop a more flexible
scheme of investing five mutual funds, then the AFORE mutual funds and the
pension mutual funds are going to have a more developed capital market and market
capitalization.
ROGERS: We also have issues of transparency, on the side of both equity and
debt. On the equity side, you have the anomaly that most Mexican issuers are not
issuing securities that represent a controlling position, and that most of the original
owners of these companies continue to control them. The ability of the minority
capital market investors to get up to date, reliable, full information about the
operations of the company, and even to attend shareholders meetings, is sometimes
a problem. Can you comment on that?
AIZA HADDAD: I think if you look at developed markets and how they have
gotten the way they are today with true pulverized capital in the market when no
individual investor will have more than a very small percentage of a company, I
think it takes a long time to get there. You still have first or second generation
individuals who created these companies, who are emotionally attached to these
companies and are not willing to give up control; very simply they are not going to
do it. But when time goes by and these generations start multiplying and diversifying and you have cousins and second cousins trying to control the company, that is
when the opportunity comes up to really pulverize the capital and have management
come in, take over the management side then have the market come in and take over
the ownership side. But that does take time.
I think another thing is also important. I know that there have been discussions
at the Ministry of Finance to get rid of this almost unique concept that exists in
Mexico, that Mexican individuals are exempt from capital gains paying through
investments in the securities exchange. I understand that very few countries in the
world have that treatment. Even though a Mexican individual is exempt from capital
gains when those gains are obtained by securities transactions, that has not been
enough. I can think of very few things that can create such a homogenous incentive
for people to invest in the securities market and yet that has not really worked as
people expected. If that is taken away, then quite frankly I cannot see the future and
see what is going to happen with individual investors in the market.
ROGERS: Mike, what is International Finance Corporation's (IFC) view on
these issues?
LUBRANO: I was just going to comment on the corporate governance issues
you were raising. You are absolutely right; the time when Mexico's securities
market will be as atomized as the U.S. is a long way off, if it ever occurs. But the
U.S. is the anomalous situation; most Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries have many listed companies that are still family
owned, or owned by a single group. And yet a lot of advance has taken place in
corporate governance, particularly in the last ten years, largely in response to the
growing importance not of atomized 'mom & pop' investors, but of institutional
investors such as mutual funds, and pension funds in particular.
I just wanted to mention that from the beginning of the year, IFC has been closely
advising the Chilean Ministry of Finance because they had a very big scandal
involving the takeover of Endesa, as it is commonly known, their largest power
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company, by a Spanish power company.6 In the process of that takeover, the
management of the company received a very disproportionate payment for their
shares because they had managed to capture the control. Those sorts of issues are
being dealt with many civil law countries, so it is even easier for Mexico to look to
those for guidance. This year at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), we are running a number of events to bring
people together from civil law countries, particularly developing countries, as well
as OECD countries to start to address those.
I was going to say that the one bright spot is that the reason this became a
massive issue in Chile was that the pension funds in Chile are now enormous. The
government will be on the hook in Mexico even more than Chile because the
Mexican government guarantees the pension funds will pay a certain minimum
amount when each worker retires.
ROGERS: We have been seeing the problems with existing institutions in
Mexico and the lack of capital. Is imposing capital controls going to help? It may
reduce volatility, but what effect will it have on satisfying the needs for capital in
the Mexican system?
CANOVA: Before I get into capital controls, I just want to comment on what
I've been hearing. It seems to me that from what Mr. Aiza Haddad and Mr. Lubrano
are saying, the private capital markets will not be able to meet the credit needs of
Mexico, including both the Mexican public and private sectors, in any way and at
any time in the foreseeable future: commercial paper, insurance companies,
investment companies, commercial banks, pension funds, mutual funds, project
financing, securitized assets. Even if put together, the private capital markets will
not accomplish the task. Can you imagine if we had tried to develop Western
Europe after World War II just on such private financial vehicles? You ask what
institutions will help meet Mexico's credit needs? I have trouble believing that
institutions like Merrill Lynch or Union Bank of Switzerland, each of which just
lost about a billion dollars on the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management
hedge fund are the types of institutions that will meet Mexico's credit needs. 7 Look
at the OECD, an institution that came out of the Marshall Plan.' If you really want
to start meeting the credit needs of a country like Mexico, you have to think about
it on that kind of a scale, such as the IMF stepping up with another allocation of
Special Drawing Rights, or an increased role for the World Bank, or the United
Oct. 24, 1997, at Al.
6. See Elizabeth Love, "Endesa Seeks to Calm Enersis Row," FINANCIAL TIMDEs,
7. Merrill Lynch & Company was a leading member of the consortium of 14 big financial companies that
injected S3.6 billion into the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management LP. Had the hedge fund collapsed,

Merrill Lynch would have incurred much larger losses. See Tracy Corrigan, Clay Harris, "Merrill to Cut 3,400 Jobs
After Sharp Fall in Profits," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at 1; Jospeh Kahn, "Merrill Cites $1.4 Billion

Exposure to Long-Term." N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at Cl; Edmund L Andrews, "Market Place: UBS says it will
reduce international lending, as well as risks like investment in distressed loans," N.Y. TMimS, Jan. 26, 1999, at
C12. ("Union Bank of Switzerland, the world's second largest bank in terms of assets, announced a 'broad retreat'
from lending and investment banking, after losing 790 million Swiss francs late last year through Long-Term
Capital Management hedge fund and other big losses in exotic currency futures and other financial derivative
products"); John Authers, "BankAnerica in $1.4 Billion Provision," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at I
("BankAmerica, the largest US commercial bank, lost more than $238 million when the Russian ruble collapsed").
8. FRED L BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER 171 (1997)(stating that the
OECD was the direct descendant of the OEEC, the organization created to divide the Marshall Plan aid). Instead,
the OECD has encouraged the predominance of private speculative capital flows. Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movements (OECD, Paris 1997).
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Nations.9 I mentioned the Tobin tax proposal - a tax of only one percent on foreign
exchange transactions, which now exceed $1.5 trillion daily, would raise something
in the order of $700 billion a year."0 Unless we have those kinds of imaginative,
creative proposals on the table and given serious consideration, the credit needs of
the Mexican population, like a lot of populations, will not be met. It is impossible
to predict the future of such markets for the year 2001. In fact, it is probably as
impossible to predict the future of such markets only a month from now.
As far as capital controls go, it seems like such prudential controls would be a
necessary first step, possibly controls on short-term capital inflows, to just stabilize
the situation so that the crisis does not develop to the point where countries are
erecting exchange restrictions all over the globe. It was mentioned that President
Zedillo said that there will be no capital controls, and it kind of reminds me of all
the proclamations that there will not be a devaluation. Capital controls, like
devaluation, require a government to proclaim they will never use them right up to
the day they announce them because of the fear of capital flight." I do, however,
think there is a real risk that when you start imposing capital controls, you start
drying up access to capital markets, and it is very hard to envision a country like
Mexico, or any country, going it alone. Prudential controls should be a part of a
more comprehensive plan involving the G-7 and the IMF.
When we study the wording of the NAFTA provisions, Article 2104 deals with
balance of payments problems. 2 And it does give Mexico the ability to impose
capital controls under those kinds of emergency conditions, although it does require
Mexico to consult with the IMF at the same time and maybe to be put under the
same kind of IMF Article 8 surveillance, with its attendant "conditionality" that
would mean a severe economic austerity program. 3

9. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) were first established by an amendment to the IMF Articles of
Agreement that went into effect in 1970. Only about $28 billion in SDRs have ever been created. See DETEv. F.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 98 (1998); See also, Paul Lewis, "Rich and Poor Nations Split on
Aid Plan," N.Y. TIMES, Oct 3, 1994, at DI, D2 (stating that demise of IMF plan to create an additional $52 billion
in SDRs for allocation to developing countries and former communist nations).
10. David Felix, THE TOBIN TAx PROPOSAL: BACKGROUND, LSSES AND PROsPECrS 13(U.N. Development
Programme for the World Summit for Social Development Policy Paper, March 1995) (estimating that a tax of
1.0% should raise about 720 billion dollars annually in tax receipts).
11. The Mexican government repeatedly denied that it would devalue the peso just prior to the severe
devaluation in December 1994. See David E. Sanger and Anthony DePalma, "On Both Sides of the Border, Peso
Ills Were Long Ignored," N.Y. TamE, Jan. 24, 1995, at Al, A9 ("the Mexican government repeatedly passed up
opportunities to devalue the peso slowly, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency failed to see the peso devaluation
coming, and the Mexican government provided the Clinton administration with a mere half-hour notice of the
December 1994 devaluation of the peso"); See also ROBERT APoNTE, "The Effects of NAFrA on Mexico-United
States Immigration," chapter in POUCY CHOICES: FREE TRADE AMONG NAFTA NATIONS 209 (K. Roberts and M.
Wilson, eds. Michigan State University Press 1996)(stating that the exchange value of the peso fell about 50

percent between December 1994 and March 1995, "a devastating reduction in purchasing power").
12. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Article 2104.
13. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Article 2104 (2Xa) requires Mexico to submit any currency account exchange
restrictions to the IMF for review under Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement. Article 2104(5) permits
Mexico to impose restrictions on international capital transactions, but "only in conjunction with measures imposed

on current international transactions under paragraph 2(a)" which requires IMF Article Vil review. Article VIII
of the IMF Articles of Agreement restricts member nations from imposing current account exchange restrictions
"without the approval of the Fund." 60 Stat, 1401 (1945). T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended, 20
U.S.T.S. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748. and 29 U.S.T.S. 2203. T.I.A.S. No. 8937 (hereinafter "Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund"), Article Vill.
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But another provision of NAFTA permits a member state to adopt reasonable
measures for prudential reasons, such as the maintenance of safety and soundness
and integrity of financial institutions, and the integrity and stability of the financial
system.' 4 Article 1410 rings of Chile's prudential controls." In short, capital
controls might be seen as a necessary component to development because of the
volatility of the financial markets, because of the hot money problem. But while
controls might be seen as a necessary component, they will not be sufficient to get
the job done. You are absolutely right that we have to look at other institutions that
are going to help Mexico and other countries meet their credit needs. The real
question is what public institutions should fill that vital role when everyone agrees
that private sector institutions, private capital markets, and private financial
instruments cannot possibly accomplish the task.
ROGERS: When you talk about additional contributions by the IMF or other
financial institutions, aren't you really talking about the taxpayers of the developed
countries stepping in and bailing out the developing countries?
CANOVA: I do not think so. My understanding of Special Drawing Rights is
that they are issued like fiat money. They used to be called paper gold. The IMF can
issue them without increasing quotas from Member States. 6 Secondly, while the
Tobin Tax proposal has been largely overlooked, maybe it's time that we start
considering some Nobel laureate economists other than Myron Scholes and Robert
Merton, the two economists who recently guided the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund into a collapse. 7 But James Tobin is also a Nobel laureate in
economics, and he has had this proposal out on the table since the late 1970's."' You
can go right back to the General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, by
John Maynard Keynes, published during the Depression, in which Keynes

14. NAFTA, supra note 1,at Article 1410(l)(exceptions for "reasonable measures for prudential reasons,
such as... (b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial responsibility of financial institutions
or cross-border financial service providers. and (c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a Party's financial
system").
15. See Craig Torres, "Chilean Stocks Rise as Government Acts," WALL STJ., June 29, 1998, at A14
(stating that Chile's prudential controls on short term capital inflows, "known locally as the encage, formerly
required investors to leave 30 percent of their investment on deposit at the central bank without interest, or pay a
3 percent tax to recover that deposit").
16. While each Member was originally allocated SDRs in proportion to its IMF quota (i.e., contribution),
the IMF has discretionary power to expand the size of SRD allocations, See Vagts, supra note 13,at 98; Lewis,
supra note 13. See also Francis Stewart, "Back to Keynesianism: Reforming the IMF." IV WORLD POuCY J.465,
477 (1987)("Currently, however, the IMF must seek explicit approval from donor governments before issuing
SDRs, a requirement that has prevented it from playing a more substantial role in maintaining world growth and
output").
17. It might be more appropriate to refer to that hedge fund as the "Short-term Speculative Capital" fund.
Long-Term Capital Management's partners included Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, two Nobel laureates in
Economics, as well as David W. Mullins Jr., a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. See Peter Trnell,
"An Alchemist who Turned Gold into Lead," N.Y. TIMEs, Sept 25, 1998, at Cl, C5. Critics could be forgiven for
questioning whether the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would have been so quick to broker a bailout of the
fund without such an elite array of partners. See Richard W. Stevenson, "Fed Chief Defends U.S. Role in Saving
Giant Hedge Fund," N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.2, 1998, at Al.
18. Tobin was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1981. See AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNESIAN
ECONOMIcS 605 (T. Cate ed., Edward Elgar Publish Ltd. 1997). For Tobin's original proposal, see James Tobin,
"'TheNew Economics One Decade Older," THE JANEWAY LECTJRES ON HISTORICAL ECONOMICS 88-93 (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1974); James Tobin, "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, Presidential
Address before the Eastern Economic Association," 1978 EASTERN ECONJ. 153.
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advocated a turnover tax on financial markets. 9 Right now in this country there is
a sizable tax on labor, the Social Security tax, which levies a combined tax of
something like 12.4% on employers and employees. What James Tobin is talking
about is a tax of something like one percent, a penny on a dollar, on capital flows.
Isn't it time that investors who have done quite well in the marketplace in the past
few years, earning double digit returns for quite a while, got out of the wagon and
pushed their weight? I do not think it would be a regressive tax on the general
taxpayer in the advanced world if you went to a Tobin tax type of solution to find
the development money that you need.
ROGERS: The free market, free flow of capital school of economics seems to
have dominated the World Bank and the IMF, and the IFC recently. Is that likely to
change as a result of the recent turmoil?
LUBRANO: In any case, most of a country's development investment needs have
to be satisfied by domestic savings. I do not think there is any case where most of
the money comes from abroad; it comes mostly from domestic savings, and Mexico
has extremely low domestic savings. The Southeast Asian countries are in trouble,
but they have very high domestic savings historically. That is a very big issue that
has to be addressed in Mexico.
I think there is a large correlation between income distribution and savings.
Countries that have broader, better, income distributions are going to have higher
savings. Until we deal with some of the issues that are preventing Mexico from
having high savings, including the so-far inability of the financial markets to
intermediate it in a fair way or at least in an efficient, predictable way, you are not
going to get that domestic savings. No amount of foreign capital will solve the
problem.
CANOVA: I think Mike made a very good point. It is hard for a country like
Mexico to have the high savings rate with the kind of income distribution it has. It
is also hard when real incomes are falling because of a severe economic austerity
program, because of high interest rates and fiscal retrenchment. I still would like to
suggest that in certain circumstances in very under-developed countries for limited
periods of time, it does make sense to rely on global transfers, even government to
government transfers. Again, the analogy of the Marshall Plan after World War II
is compelling. It would have been somewhat unrealistic to expect the Germans and
the French for instance, coming out of that war's devastation, to have the private
savings to reconstruct their economic infrastructures.
LUBRANO: One thing; Mexico is not a poor country; the amount of money you
are talking about is much larger than the majority of the World Bank's beneficiaries.
CANOVA: I would rather focus on the gap between Mexico's resources and
the resources of rich countries and surplus countries, rather than focus on the
19. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYmENr, INTEREsr, AND MONEY 159-160

(1964)(stating "The introduction of a substantial Government transfer tax on all [financial] transactions might
prove the most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the predominance of speculation over
enterprise in the United States").
20. HENNING BONH, "Social Security Reform and Financial Markets," chapter in SOCIAL SECURITY
REFoRM: CoNFERENCE PRoCEEDINGS 197 (S. Sass, R. Triest, ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference
Series No. 41, June 1997X"combined employer and employee contributions to Social Security's Old Age, Survivors
Insurance, and Disability Insurance Funds amount to 12.4 percent of covered payroll").
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differences between Mexico and poorer nations. Moreover, it is arguable that the
West European recipients of Marshall Plan aid, though devastated by war, were
relatively richer that Mexico today. So the amount of money I am talking about is
actually commensurate with or even less than previous levels of aid.
LUBRANO: One thing I do also want to mention. Part of the income distribution
problem has got to be traceable to the product markets in Mexico, which remain
monopolistic and oligopolistic at best. If we could get 100 per cent enforcement of
one law in the country, I would pick the anti-monopoly law, the competition law of
the country.
ROGERS: To some extent I think we have seen the force of competition in some
areas of the Mexican economy, such as the telecommunications area. I think
Tel~fonos de Mexico (TELMEX) is providing substantially better service than it
was a few years ago, largely because of the competition it is facing.
Going back to the issue of foreign capital, before we write off the willingness or
interest of foreign sources of capital to assist in this process, I would like to ask
Luis Danton to what extent he sees institutions like Citibank, Citigroup, being able
to play a role in providing capital for the Mexican economy?
DANTON: It is likely that we will see an increase in participation of the foreign
investment in the system. As you explained in your presentation, there has been a
consistent trend in such a direction. Part of the debate centers on whether the
participation of foreign banks in the system actually provides expertise and
improves the system. I am convinced the participation of top tier foreign financial
institutions, such as Citibank, does contribute positively. This is very important,
given that international events will be increasingly important in shaping what
happens in each country. Particularly in the case of Citibank, it contributes a wealth
of expertise and international resource. I think that such participation will be
reflected in increased competition with the presence of a high quality service
provider.
The challenge for Mexican banks is to do what they are expected to do, lend
money and get paid. Most of the technical issues have been addressed here on the
side of getting paid. Improving guarantees, legal reforms to the bankruptcy laws,
and even minor improvements can have a significant effect like improving local
registries and bringing them up to a uniform level.
It is difficult to predict what is going to happen with the banks and reform, but
what is sure is that we will see this type of absolute insurance that FOBAPROA has
provided disappear. It will be replaced with some kind of selective coverage
insurance, such as that provided by the FDIC. I think that the banks that have better
systems and expertise in place will benefit, from such selective coverage insurance,
because they will be perceived as less risky than others are. It is not going to be
easy.
The challenge, particularly for Citibank, is to successfully enter into new market
niches, such as financing small and medium companies. The challenge is to be
perceived as an imbedded bank, as a national bank, as a consumer bank and I think
we are achieving that.
The participation of foreign investment and banks will be important to increasing
competition in benefit of consumers. The merger between Travelers Group and
Citibank will permit Citibank to provide a wider range of services in Mexico than
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before. Furthermore, Citibank will develop an incredible experience in debt
collection and restructuring with the acquisition of Confia.2'
Added together, these things will hopefully contribute to having a better banking
system, a banking system that actually lends money for productive activities and
provides high quality services in consumer banking.
ROGERS: Before we go to questions by the audience, does anyone else have any
comment?
CANOVA: I would just like to comment on the issue of income distribution
again because it is very important; I think there are a lot of complicated factors that
go into Mexico's top-heavy distribution, including some that Mike suggested. But
I would also like to repeat my earlier theme of showing a little humility, to
recognize that the United States has a very top-heavy distribution. 22 The Federal
Reserve conducts a tri-annual Survey of Consumer Finance. The last one showed
that the top one percent of the U.S. population now controls more wealth than the
bottom ninety percent.2 3 It is clear that the top one-half of one percent will soon
control more wealth than the bottom ninety percent. We have not had such topheavy distributions in this country since the late 1920s.'
ROGERS: On a final note, would there be a way for something like a hedge fund
such as Long Term Capital to be formed in Mexico other than as a SOFOL?
LUBRANO: I think you have two options there: the placement of equity
securities and a mutual fund. But I think the way that fund in particular was created
was that it was formed more as a closed end private fund that would generally
speaking in Mexico probably not be subject to any kind of regulation, to the extent
that it was a small group of people making an investment (even if it is a huge
investment) together, then passing it on to certain managers. It would probably
qualify under a particular provision of the Mexican securities laws as just a money
manager. But probably the regulation would be either completely null or de minimis
to create a fund such as that. So I think that one in particular would be set up in a
couple of days, to the extent that the money is there and the interest is there.
AIZA HADDAD: It is my understanding that some of the hedge funds evade
U.S. federal securities laws by having specific exemptions, having less than 100
wealthy, sophisticated investors and off- shore incorporation, for example.25

21. See Banking & Securities Commission Assumes Control of Bankrupt Grupo Financiero Abaco,
SOURCEMEX ECONOMIC NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MEXICO, Sept 3, 1997 (detailing the Banco Confia purchase).

22. See Richard Stevenson, "Fiscal Stones, Glass Houses: Bailout Points Finger Bach Toward the U.S..,"
N.Y. TimE, Sept. 26. 1998, at Al.

23. See Authur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer, and Annika E. Sunden, "Family Finances in the U.S.:
Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances," 83 FEDERAL RESERvE BULLErIN 21. Table 14 (Jan.
1997); DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREEr 67 (1997); Arthur B. Kennickell and R. Louise Woodbum, Consistent
Weight Design for the 1989, 1992, and 1995 SCFs, and the Distribution of Wealth, 30, Table 9 (unpublished

Federal Reserve technical paper, revised August 1997); Willem Thorbecke, "Who will pay for Disinflation?:
Disinflationary Monetary Policy and the Distribution of Income," Public Policy Brief no.38 (Jerome Levy

Economics Institute, Annandale-on -Hudson, New York 1997).
24. See Henwood, id. at 66 ("wealth is now the most concentrated it's been since the 1920's").
25. See "Hearings on H.R. 1495 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance," 104th Cong.
(1995) (testimony of Barry P. Barbash, director of Securities and Exchange Commission), (1995 WL

641412)(S.E.C.);"Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance Committee on Commerce.
United States Securities and Exchange Commission to Consider Rules Implementing Various Provision of the

National Securities Markets Act of 1996," 105th Cong. (1997), (testimony of Barry P. Barbash, director of Security
and Exchange Commission), S.E.C.97-29, 1997 WL 155021 (S.E.C.).
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LUBRANO: Such funds do not offer securities to the public and thus do not
meet the definition of "Investment Company" under the U.S. Investment Act of
1940. So it is not really a securities law issue in the sense of investor protection.
Rather it is a securities market stability issue.
AIZA HADDAD: And becoming a banking regulation problem to the degree
that banks have really exposed themselves in loans to these hedge funds.
CANOVA: That argues in favor of regulating the banks, what the banks can do
in purchasing derivative instruments or in lending to hedge funds.26
LUBRANO: Limiting loans to the hedge funds would make it more difficult for
the hedge funds to leverage such risk.
ROGERS: Clearly the hedge funds have become a significant potential
regulatory issue in the U.S. If something similar were to be formed, or maybe has
already been formed perhaps - Raul Salinas' investment fund was a closed-end
hedge fund- but if it were to be formed in Mexico, is that something we can look to?
We know there are many wealthy individuals in Mexico who are looking for ways
to invest their funds. We have explored all the traditional methods, the capital
markets, investing in banks, and the like. Is there some new vehicle or some new
approach that we have not yet explored?
LUBRANO: I guess what you really mean is more of the private equity fund than
a hedge fund. The hedge fund, particularly this one, was basically running an
arbitrage operation. We are not looking to make the market more efficient with
private, big investors and arbitrage. IFC has investments in a number of private
equity funds and our experience has been it is not a huge pipeline for investments
in Mexico given the huge size of the Mexican economy. It is expensive money.
Private equity money does not seek a low, steady rate of return but rather a large
lump sum return at the end. There are not a lot of projects in Mexico that are likely
to earn that kind of return. Before I came to IFC, I had the privilege of working on
a venture capital fund. It turned around companies that basically had blown up in
the 1980s and through the bankruptcy system had managed to evade their creditors
for ten years. If we could get the other creditors to take 10€ on the dollar, we would
take the thing over. One of them was Ekco, the company that produces tableware
and kitchen appliances. Maybe there is a market for that once the huge overhang of
impaired assets in Mexico starts to develop a market.
NADER: Just going back to the private equity investments, unless they want to
place securities in the public or they want to have a very active borrowing activity
in Mexico, they could be created as unrelated stock companies. A test of what Mike
was mentioning is coming up very rapidly. There were maybe 30 or 40 projects of

26. A recent study by U.S. bank regulators suggested the need for stringent public regulation of hedge funds,
including extension of regulation to "offshore"jurisdictions, to prevent further financial meltdowns; but the study
did not recommend enhanced regulation of banks, even though it found bank lending to be partly at fault for the
Long-Term Capital Management crisis. See Timothy L O'Brien, "Report Finds Banks Failed to Oversee Big Hedge

Fund," N.Y. TtMs, Jan. 29, 1999, at C3.(report critical of commercial and investment bank lending to Long-Term
Capital Management hedge fund was prepared by the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Comptroller
of the Currency); See also Leslie Wayne, "Congress to Debate Greater Oversight of Hedge Funds," N.Y. TIMES.
Oct. 1,1998, at CI,C3 ("The main regulatory question raised by the Long-Term Capital episode was why banking
regulators never saw early warning flags that would have indicated banks had already extended too much credit
to an already overly indebted fund. Banks lending to Long-Term Capital are regulated primarily by the Federal
Reserve and by the State of New York").
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high yield bonds to be issued by Mexican companies, I would say, in the period
from September to December. All or most of these have been postponed or taken
off the market. Some of the issuers nonetheless are in need of capital and I am sure
some of them will be testing private equity sources. What I understand is that the
returns expected in this market could be fairly high. We may be on the verge of
starting to see very active campaigning by Mexican companies to attract these
funds. If they are somewhat successful, this could give rise to a new trend that has
not been really significant in Mexico.
ROGERS: We have talked about the transparency and corporate governance
issues that may impede investments in private companies on the equity side. We
have not really talked about potential transparency issues on the debt side. That is,
to the extent that bondholders meetings held in Mexico are sufficiently transparent
for foreign bondholders to give them sufficient comfort that in the event of
problems they can have an effective voice. Does anyone have any thoughts on that?
NADER: I think as a general rule there is transparency. I think lack of
transparency is the exception and one of the benefits of global capital markets is
that where markets perceive lack of transparency, the punishment to the issuer can
be very severe. Mexican companies have come a long way because if we look at the
stock market, most of those companies have gone public in the last 15 to 20 years.
It was not until maybe the last ten years where they have placed a significant equity
share in the market.
ROGERS: When I talk about lack of transparency on the debt side, what I am
thinking of is more in the area of securitizations that have involved transactions
where the administration of the special purpose vehicle has not been optimum. The
recourse of the bondholders in cases where you had particularly porous transfers,
such as transfers of hotel sale receivables, these can lead to very disappointed
investors. I do not know if that is a problem of transparency in the process or
transparency in the structuring or the efficacy by which you have structured the
arrangement under which the special purpose vehicle will operate. Carlos, do you
have any thoughts?
AIZA HADDAD: I think that one case in particular had a major negative impact
in the market for asset securitization or quasi-securitization, which is what they did.
In that case, I think that both issuers, intermediaries and investors have learned from
that experience. It is a major experience.
For those of you who are not that familiar with the problem, the issue was
acceptance corporations created by a large Mexican hotel company that sold hotel
real property to various buyers and then sold off the notes and other receivables that
it obtained through those sales. It was really a problem that came up in the due
diligence for the transaction. The problem was not so much in the management of
the special purpose vehicle or the job that the trustee did in the various trusts that
were created, but in particular the underlying transactions and the way that they
were carried out. I think that we have all learned from that experience in particular,
at least I have personally in looking into the underlying transactions and the way in
which they were done. I think people now need to think in particular about the
intermediaries that participated in the transactions and to be a lot more careful in
looking at the issuers.
Just the fact that they were dollar denominated and that they were generating or
were supposed to generate cash flows in dollars because hotels historically generate
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cash flows in hard currency I think in a way blinded the intermediaries that participated in that transaction. There was no transparency, John, but I think everyone
learned from that experience. I am not saying I do not think it will happen again, but
I think it is a good opportunity to make progress so that the next time things like that
are done, they are done a lot more carefully.
ROGERS: What would be the advantages of dollarizing the Mexican economy,
if any?
CANOVA: I am skeptical about dollarizing any economy. I know Mike might
have a different view. A mid-way solution may be what both Hong Kong and
Argentina have done with the currency convertibility boards, but such currency
boards have still been powerless to prevent speculative runs away from the
currencies of those countries." While Argentina's currency board has helped bring
the inflation rate down dramatically, such disinflation has occurred at the cost of
severe unemployment, currently a double-digit unemployment rate.'
LUBRANO: I do not think that a currency board is likely to work in Mexico,
because I do not believe that the financial community, or particularly the Mexican
public, would have much confidence that it would be run as well as the Argentines
have managed to operate theirs. After all, the model is the Hong Kong currency
board and I do not think that they are ever going to get that degree of confidence.
There have been too many shenanigans, too little transparency in the course of the
last four or five years in the handling of Mexico's finances and the financial sector.
If you want to have it in dollars, I think you have to get it in dollars; I do not think
they can use a currency board.
CANOVA: The currency board model does not seem to provide fail-safe
protection. Both Argentina and Hong Kong have been victims of speculative attack
in the form of short-term capital outflows. As a consequence, Argentina has been
forced to sharply raise interest rates, and Hong Kong has intervened in the open
markets on a massive scale, including open market purchases of shares listed on its
own stock market.29
ROGERS: We would like to have questions from the audience.
JAIME GUERRA, Mexico City: Do you think that the national banking
commission has acted in accordance with the law? It seems to me that they always
go to an extreme delay in certain circumstances in banking defaults in Mexico.

27. See Ken Warn, "World Crisis Hits Growth Forecast in Argentina," FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998,
at 6; Louise Lucas, "Hong Kong Reveals $15 Billion Spending on Shares," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct 27, 1998, at 1.
28. See Anthony Faiola, "Brazil's Ills Distress Continent; Money Crisis Shakes Investors' Confidence,"
WASH. PosT, Feb 1, 1999, at AI(Argentina's reported unemployment rate at 12.5 percent); Country Report:
Argentina: Economy: Unemployment Rate Reaches a Plateau, THE ECONOMIST INTELIUGENCE UNrr, Dec. 5, 1998
(WL 22843246)(Argentina's 13.2 percent unemployment rate was held steady by a reduction in labor supply and
lower participation rate); See also "Sixty Percent of Buenos Aires Residents Uve in Poverty," AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Sept. 7, 1998 (stating that more than 7 million of the capital city's 12 million residents have monthy
household incomes below 1000 pesos [$1000], while basic bare-minumum monthly living expenses for typical
family exceed 1030 pesos).
29. See Ken Warn, "Argentina Forced to Pay Higher Interest Rates," FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at
3 ("because of its proximity to the Brazilian crisis, the interest rate on Argentina's 91- day dollar-denoinated
Treasury bills, know as Ltes, nearly doubled from 7.8 percent on August 11 to 13.96 percent by mid September
1998"); Lucas, supra note 28 ("...the Hong Kong government engaged in large open market purchases of private
company stock to defend its currency from speculative attack").
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My second question is, do you think it is proper for the federal government to
bank with private investors in order to compete with them under the same
circumstances, and given that banking is also a social function? I mean, can the
federal government create a ministry of banking different from the finance banking
in order to compete with private investors in Mexico, since banking has a social
function?
NADER: On the first question, I think the banking commission clearly has not
done its job. Yesterday I mentioned that we have to be fair in looking at people's
acts and I think that the volume of work that the banking commission has to
undertake is significantly more than what it was doing five years ago. It was only
five or six years ago where there were eighteen banks. All of them happened to be
owned by the same party and basically at that point we had an economy that was
trying to move from state-owned economy to an economy led by the private sector.
Banks were not required to do banking; whether lending to a Comisi6n Federal de
Electricidad (CFE) or PEMEX, or any other para-state entity, I think it implied the
same analysis. There was basically no analysis because they all were relying on the
government's support. My colleagues have said that the banking commission has
lost most of its securities expertise. I think the banking commission lost all of its
banking expertise because between 1982 and 1992 there was very little or no
banking done. That is not to release the banking commission from not doing its job;
I am just trying to put it in perspective.
Second, I think the banking commission has been late in many instances. To me
one of the most frightening cases is that of Confia. Everyone knew that the bank
was on the verge of insolvency and nonetheless they would still permit issuance of
bonds by the holding company. Even then, when the damage had been done in the
market, they should have stopped trading on those bonds. I think it was too late
because of a policing law. It was basically exaggerated becauseof the deficiencies
in the privatization of the banking system.
I think reform to the law of the banking commission is needed. I personally am
very skeptical as to the projects of reform unless we start having a banking
commission, a central bank and ministry of finance that are staffed by different
people. At the end of the day if we have three institutions, but there is one point
where all coincide, which is at the board of governors, we are not doing our job. We

are creating a lot of inefficiencies, bureaucracy, and it is not going to work unless
we have professionals looking at each and every aspect of the system, not the same
persons looking at the same system and just moving from one door to another.
ROGERS: And on the second question?
AIZA HADDAD: I am going to be very brief on a couple of things. First of all,
I want to touch on the banking and securities commission issue. The legislative
amendment proposal right now suggests moving the banking and securities
commission over to the central bank. If we create a career for central bankers from
the commission to the central bank, if we make that independent from the executive
branch of power, I think with time wee will get to a much more efficient surveillance and financial authority.
If I understood the second question correctly, it was whether it is convenient to
open up foreign investment openly to banking services, considering that banking
service is a public service. I am all for it; I do not see what damage that could cause.
I think that competition is the best thing for the public, so to the extent that the
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regulatory agencies and statutes are working, it is not really important who owns the
banks or who controls the banks. You have appropriate competition for the ultimate
benefit of the credit consumers.
CANOVA: May I make one comment? It seems that we did not fully answer the
dollarization question; we did not really say what might be wrong with
dollarization. It seems to me that by dollarizing their economy, Mexico would in
essence be handing monetary policy over to the central bank in the United States.
As it is, with liberalized capital accounts, Mexico's monetary policy is pretty
limited anyway, but mostly by private market forces. It would probably be more
politically dangerous to dollarize. If the Federal Reserve has to tighten the money
supply and raise interest rates because it perceives economic growth in the United
States to be too strong, it might be politically unpopular, even unacceptable, in
Mexico that the tune is being played in Washington, and there would not be other
intermediary institutions like the IMF or the international capital markets to take the
heat.3° Finally, dollarization might not be in the best interest of the United States
since it could entail a vast expansion on the Federal Reserve's supervisory
responsibilities.3
GILL: I think we must adjourn and thank this excellent panel - provocative,
creative, led by our moderator, John Rogers.

30. See Stephen Fidler, "Dollarization 'Not a Quick Fix,"' FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at 8
("dollarization could result in loss of monetary policy autonomy and flexibility, as well as the loss of benefits from
seignorage, the interest earned by the central bank on the issuance of currency"); Ken War and Stephen Fidler,

"Argentine Central Bank Presents Plan for Switch to Dollar," FiNANciAL Twls, Jan. 22, 1999, at I ("investors'
fears of devaluation, sparked by Brazil's devaluation, forced Argentina to pay a high interest rate premium, and
renewed support for plans to dollarize the Argentine economy... dollarization could also leave Argentina's financial
system vulnerable if the Federal Reserve does not exercise its 'lender of last resort'powers to stem an Argentine

financial crisis").
31. See Stephen Fidler and Richard Lapper, "Summers Warns on Dollarization," FINANCIAL TIMES, March
15, 1999, at i.

